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Abstract
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems are vulnerable
to spoofing attacks using speech generated by voice conversion
and speech synthesis techniques. Commonly, a countermeasure
(CM) system is integrated with an ASV system for improved
protection against spoofing attacks. But integration of the two
systems is challenging and often leads to increased false rejec-
tion rates. Furthermore, the performance of CM severely de-
grades if in-domain development data are unavailable. In this
study, therefore, we propose a solution that uses two separate
background models – one from human speech and another from
spoofed data. During test, the ASV score for an input utterance
is computed as the difference of the log-likelihood against the
target model and the combination of the log-likelihoods against
two background models. Evaluation experiments are conducted
using the joint ASV and CM protocol of ASVspoof 2015 cor-
pus consisting of text-independent ASV tasks with short utter-
ances. Our proposed system reduces error rates in the pres-
ence of spoofing attacks by using out-of-domain spoofed data
for system development, while maintaining the performance for
zero-effort imposter attacks compared to the baseline system.
Index Terms: Speaker verification, Spoofing, UBM, Cross-
corpora
1. Introduction
In recent years, significant progress has been made in auto-
matic speaker verification (ASV) technology, which now finds
many real-world authentication applications, e.g. in physical
and logical access control systems. But recent studies [1] show
that spoofing attacks using artificial speech, generated by voice
conversion (VC) or speech synthesis (SS) techniques, severely
compromise the security of ASV systems regardless of the ap-
plied paradigms; degradations have been reported for Gaussian
mixture model – universal background model (GMM-UBM)
[2, 3, 4], Hidden markov model (HMM) [5] and i-vector [6, 7]
based ASV systems, to mention a few.
In order to deal with spoofing attacks, an ASV system typ-
ically uses a spoofing detector module as a countermeasure
(CM). Here, the task of a CM is to detect whether a speech sig-
nal is uttered by a human or is an artificial signal generated by
VC or SS algorithms. The CM score is then combined with that
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Figure 1: Our baseline involves linear fusion of ASV and spoof-
ing countermeasure that may use different features X and Y.
The proposed approach uses shared features with two back-
ground models whose contributions are traded off with param-
eter β, to tackle both zero-effort impostor and spoofing attacks.
of the ASV system to make a joint decision on a test speech sig-
nal. During the past few years, a number of CMs have been pro-
posed to discriminate synthetic speech from real human voice
[8, 9]. Mostly, these CMs are implemented as additional mod-
ules to ASV systems (as in Fig. 1a), demanding careful, po-
tentially challenging, design considerations, such as the selec-
tion or optimization of front-end features that might differ from
those used in the ASV system. Moreover, most spoofing de-
tectors do not generalize well to unseen conditions including
unknown types of attacks, data and environments, which col-
lectively define a domain. For instance, a recent study [10]
reported considerably increased error rates for various coun-
termeasures when evaluated on another corpus (out-of-domain
data).
On the basis of these observations, this work aims to
provide a simpler and generalized solution to the artificial
speech spoofing detection problem by enhancing ASV tolerance
against spoofing attacks without a dedicated additional spoofing
detector. Our idea is to enhance a conventional GMM-based
ASV system so that it inherently rejects a spoofed speech trial
as an impostor. A related prior work [7] with a similar goal tack-
led the problem using an i-vector approach to handle artificial
speech spoofing attacks in long utterances using probabilistic
linear discriminant analysis (PLDA) model trained on natural
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and artificial speech data. In contrast, we focus on the GMM-
UBM framework better suited for short utterances [11, 12]. Our
idea (Fig. 1b) is straightforward: in addition to the ‘conven-
tional’ UBM, trained on human speech, we use an additional
UBM trained on spoofed speech. We formulate and extensively
experiment with various flavors of this key idea.
We conduct ASV experiments on the ASVspoof 2015 cor-
pus [13] consisting of human speech and spoofed speech gen-
erated by different VC and SS methods, and address in partic-
ular the issue of out-of-domain training. To this end, we use
the IDIAP-AVspoof database [14] as our out-of-domain train-
ing data and evaluate the countermeasures on ASVspoof 2015.
The IDIAP-AVspoof database is considered out-of-domain as it
differs from the ASVspoof 2015 data in terms of both human
speech recording settings and spoofing methods. Our study re-
veals that ASV performance in the presence of spoofing attacks
can be considerably boosted by appropriate data engineering
without building a separate explicit spoofing detector. In fact,
the proposed solution outperforms the combination of an ASV
system and a spoofing detector.
2. ASV in Presence of Spoofing Attacks
2.1. Conventional GMM-UBM based ASV Systems
Previous studies [11, 12] indicate that traditional GMM-UBM
[15] can outperform i-vector based speaker verification with
short utterances. Therefore, earlier work on ASV with spoofed
speech [2, 3, 4, 16] used GMM-UBM based systems for per-
formance evaluation. We also use this technique where speaker
models are adapted from a UBM with maximum-a-posteriori
(MAP) adaptation using target speaker’s training data [15].
During test, log-likelihood ratio (LLR) for a test utterance X =
{x1,x2, . . . ,xL} is computed using the target model λtar and
the background model λasvubm as follows:
LLRasv(X) =
1
L
{
log p(X|λtar)− log p(X|λasvubm)
}
(1)
The LLR value is used for decision making. Typically, the
background model, λasvubm, is trained with real human speech.
2.2. GMM-UBM system fused with a spoofing detector
To improve the performance of ASV systems in presence of
spoofing attacks, a standalone spoofing detector countermea-
sure, or CM for short, is integrated with ASV. The task of the
CM is to detect the non-human or spoofed speech as impos-
tor. In literature [8, 17], two types of integration are consid-
ered. The first one is decision fusion where a test utterance
is accepted only when it is jointly approved by both ASV and
CM systems. In the second approach, recognition scores from
the two systems are combined to obtain a final score for de-
cision making. We adopt the former approach illustrated in
Figure 1a, requiring only a single decision threshold. We use
a two-class GMM-based method [18, 19] using two separate
GMMs [20] trained independently with real human and spoofed
data. In test, for a given test utterance with CM features as
Y = {y1,y2, . . . ,yL}, LLR value is calculated between the
human and spoof speech GMM as,
LLRcm(Y) =
1
L
{
log p(Y|λhumangmm )− log p(Y|λspoofgmm )
}
(2)
Here LLRcm(Y) is the countermeasure score used for detecting
whether an utterance is spoofed or human speech irrespective
of the target speaker. In general, different front-end features are
used for spoofing detection and ASV [8]. The output score for
a given test utterance in the combined ASV with CM system
can be expressed as,
α× LLRasv(X) + (1− α)× LLRcm(Y), (3)
which, using Eqs. (1) and (2), can be rewritten as,
=
1
L
[
α log p(X|λtar)− {α log p(X|λasvubm) (4)
−(1− α) log p(Y|λhumangmm )} − (1− α) log p(Y|λspoofgmm )
]
Here, α ∈ [0, 1] is a fusion weight. We observe that
• The special cases α = 0 and α = 1 correspond to,
respectively, standalone CM and baseline ASV without
any CM protection.
• In the special case of shared features for ASV and CM
(X = Y) and shared human data used for ASV back-
ground and CM training (λasvubm = λ
human
gmm ), Eq. (4) be-
comes,
1
L
[
α log p(X|λtar)− (2α− 1) log p(X|λhumangmm ) (5)
−(1− α) log p(X|λspoofgmm )
]
The joint system can be viewed as a speaker verification system
with two background models with different weights for human
and spoof UBMs and here the target speaker model is estimated
from human data.
2.3. Proposed ASV system
Inspired by Eq. (5), we propose a two-UBM based ASV sys-
tem, where one UBM is trained using human and another using
spoofed speech. In enrollment, target speaker models are still
MAP-adapted from the human UBM, λhumangmm , but the test LLR
score computation involves combination of both UBMs scores.
A control parameter β trades off the two UBM scores, leading
to the following LLR score:
LLR(X) =
1
L
{
log p(X|λtar)− (6)[
β × log p(X|λhumangmm ) + (1− β)× log p(X|λspoofgmm )]
}
This system can be viewed as a joint spoofing and human back-
ground model for ASV that uses a shared feature space, instead
of the approach combining two separate subsystems (an ASV
system and a CM system that use different features as presented
in Sec.2.2). For β = 1, it reduces to the standalone ASV sys-
tem as in Eq. (1), while for the other extreme β = 0, it acts
as a two-GMM based ASV system using the spoof UBM for
background normalization:
LLR(X) =
1
L
{
log p(X|λtar)− log p(X|λspoofgmm )
}
(7)
The interesting values, however, are 0 < β < 1. The proposed
method always holds the concept of speaker verification by in-
herently accounting for the two negative hypotheses together
in standalone ASV frameworks and will be able to reject more
spoofing impostors than the conventional standalone ASV. We
consider two alternative approaches for choosing this additional
control parameter. In System 1, β is computed ‘on-the-fly’ for
a given input, based on the likelihood of the test feature vectors
scored against human and spoof UBMs,
β(X) =
p(X|λhumangmm )
p(X|λhumangmm ) + p(X|λspoofgmm )
(8)
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Table 1: Interpretation of the control parameters for baseline and proposed integrated system.
Method Control parameter Interpretation of the task
Baseline
α = 0 Speaker verification suitable for spoofed impostors only.
α = 1 Speaker verification suitable for zero-effort impostors only.
0 < α < 1 Speaker verification suitable for both impostors but constrained control over the trade-offs
Proposed
β = 0 Speaker verification suitable for spoofed imposters and to some extent for zero-effort impostors.
β = 1 Speaker verification suitable for zero-effort impostors.
0 < β < 1 Speaker verification suitable for both impostors but with flexible control to trade-off of the two cases.
Hence, β(X) emphasizes the score of the particular UBM ac-
cording to the test data. In contrast, in System 2, we optimize β
using a disjoint development set by linear grid search over [0, 1]
and fix this optimized value on future data.
Table 1 summarizes the functionality of the baseline and
the proposed ASV systems for different value of their respective
control parameters.
3. Experimental setup
Experiments are conducted on the joint ASV and CM protocol
of the ASVspoof 2015 corpus [8, 13] consisting of 81 target
speakers (35 male and 46 female). Each speaker has five ut-
terances for enrollment. The joint protocol has two types of
non-target trials: zero-effort human impostors (Z) and spoof im-
postors (S) (speech generated by SS and VC). Table 2 shows
the trial statistics where G stands for human (genuine) trials.
Table 2: Number of trials for ASV experiments on development
(dev) and evaluation (eval) sets for ASVspoof2015.
Male Female
G Z S G Z S
Dev. 1498 4275 21375 1999 5700 28500
Eval. 4053 8000 80000 5351 10400 104000
The baseline ASV system is implemented with gender-
dependent UBM of 512 Gaussians trained on the data from
the IDIAP-AVSpoof database [14]. The target models are en-
rolled using MAP adaptation process with relevance factor of 3.
The spoofing detector is also trained on the same corpora, i.e.,
IDIAP-AVSpoof. In total, it consists of 10887 male and 4661
female speech files for human; and 47000 male and 8255 fe-
male spoofed files. For the proposed ASV, we train the UBMs
separately on human and spoofed speech. Since the main exper-
iments are conducted on ASVspoof 2015 and spoofing detector
is trained on AVSpoof, our evaluation follows the cross-copora
evaluation strategy for countermeasures [10].
For ASV, we use 57-dimensional MFCCs (19
static+∆+∆∆) computed from speech frames using 20ms
Hamming window with 10ms overlap. We have performed
RASTA [21] filtering, energy-based speech activity detection
(SAD) and cepstral mean and variance normalization (CMVN).
For the spoofing detector, we use 40-dimensional MFCCs (20
∆+∆∆) as used in [10]. For the proposed ASV system, we
also use the same 57-dimensional MFCCs as baseline ASV.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Baseline ASV performance under spoofing attacks
Table 3 shows the ASV performance under spoofing attacks of
different types (human, spoof). As expected, EERs of ASV are
generally much higher under spoof impostor attacks than un-
der zero-effort impostors. EER of spoof impostors is higher in
the real speech UBM based ASV system than the other. This is
expected as this UBM has no information about the attributes
of spoofed data and therefore is unable to reject spoofing im-
postors. Mix1 (a UBM trained from pooled human and spoof
data features) and Mix2 (a UBM trained by first training human
and spoof GMMs, each with 256 Gaussians, followed by merg-
ing the Gaussians and mixing weight re-normalization) cases
show lower EERs specifically for the spoof impostors in con-
trast to the real speech UBM system, as their negative hypothe-
sis, i.e. UBM has been built using spoofed data and hence cap-
tured some attributes of the spoofed speech. The performance
of Mix1 and Mix2 systems is similar in general, as might be ex-
pected. In the remaining experiments, we consider Mix1 as a
baseline.
Table 3: Effect of different datasets in building UBM on ASV
performance (%EER) of development set of ASVspoof 2015
database. Real: human speech, Mix1: feature pooling, Mix2:
Gaussian pooling to create a UBM. See text for details.
UBM Trn. data Male Female
Human Spoof Z S Z S
Real X × 6.99 36.99 11.29 31.81
Mix1 X X 7.27 32.14 10.42 29.54
Mix2 X X 6.80 33.87 10.49 29.86
4.2. Proposed ASV systems under spoofing attacks
We first study the performance of the proposed methods for dif-
ferent values of β on the development set. For simplicity, we
present the ASV performance of System 2 for different values
of β (for male speakers) in Fig. 2.
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β
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Figure 2: Effect of β on ASV performance (%EER) for zero-
effort and spoofing conditions with the proposed System 2 on
development set of ASVspoof2015.
By increasing the value of β, which decreases the contribution
of the spoof UBM, the EER of the real human zero-effort im-
postors (Z) decreases while the EER of the spoofing impostors
(S) increases. The range β ∈ [0.7, 0.9] yields closer perfor-
mance for the Z impostor to the baseline ASV system. At the
same time, EER of the spoof impostors reduces remarkably.
From now onwards, we use β = 0.7 for the rest of the ex-
periments with proposed System 2.
Table 4 compares the ASV performance on the evaluation
set using the optimal value β = 0.7 obtained from the devel-
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Table 4: Performance comparison (in terms of %EER) of the
proposed method with baseline for ASV under spoofing in
ASVspoof 2015 database.
System Male Female Avg.Z S Z S EER
Development set:
Baseline 7.27 32.14 10.42 29.54 19.84
Combined ASV 6.47 27.23 9.85 26.26 17.45
Prop. System 1 7.81 28.10 12.40 27.26 18.89
Prop. System 2
β = 0.0 15.36 9.08 25.56 20.61 17.65
β = 0.5 8.61 12.41 14.95 18.04 13.50
β = 0.7 6.80 18.21 11.36 19.95 14.08
β = 1.0 6.99 36.99 11.29 31.81 21.77
Evaluation set:
Baseline 9.18 32.44 8.65 24.76 18.75
Combined ASV 9.03 28.05 7.10 20.18 16.09
Prop. System 1 9.67 28.81 9.70 21.95 17.53
Prop. System 2
β = 0.0 17.56 12.80 23.14 16.52 17.50
β = 0.5 10.65 15.32 12.28 14.07 13.08
β = 0.7 8.41 20.20 8.51 15.30 13.10
β = 1.0 8.47 36.68 9.28 26.68 20.27
opment set as well as for other two boundary cases for β = 0
and β = 1. In addition, we show results for a combined ASV
system with a linear combination of two separate ASV systems
– one trained with human speech as UBM and another with
spoofed speech as UBM. The motivation to use this system is
to observe whether the additional speaker model with respect
to spoof GMM further helps the ASV under spoofing attacks or
not. Similar to System 2, we determine the linear fusion weight
using the development set.
From Table 4, we can see that the proposed method 1, 2
shows lower/comparable EER values for human impostor (Z)
with compared to the baseline. However, the proposed methods
shows much EER reduction for the spoof. Similar phenomena
is observed on evaluation set. The error rate in System 1 for
spoof impostor is quite higher than the System 2. It could be
due to the better optimization of β using data driven approach
on development in compared to likelihood proportion of two
UBMs. Overall observations indicate that the proposed method
is very useful for the ASV system in real-life specially when
system has no priori knowledge about the test spoof (i.e out-
domain data set).
4.3. Comparison of the baseline with the best proposed
method with/without an out-of-domain spoofing detector
In this section, we compare the performance of the baseline
with the best proposed ASV system (System 2 for β = 0.7)
with or without a spoofing detector under spoofing attacks on
ASVspoof 2015. We show the comparative performance in
Fig. 3 for different values of fusion weight α (for simplicity
in male speakers) on the development set. From Fig. 3, we ob-
serve that with lower value of α, i.e. the joint system gets more
contribution from CM than ASV. As a result, EER value for the
human impostor increases, and vice versa for the spoofed im-
postor. In Table 5, we show the performance of the baseline and
the proposed System 2 for different values of fusion weight on
evaluation data. Fusion weight equal to 1.0 indicates that only
the ASV system is used whereas a weight of 0.0 means the com-
bined system acts as a spoofing detector only. We observe that
the proposed system gives reasonable improvement for spoofed
trials with α = 1.0, i.e., even without using any spoofing de-
tector. For fusion of ASV and CM, we have found an optimum
value of α as 0.9 on the development set for both male and
female speakers. This also gives best ASV performance with
spoofed impostors on the evaluation set. The performance is
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Figure 3: Comparison performance (%EER) of standalone
baseline ASV with the best proposed method with or without
out-domain spoofing detector i.e. CM on development set of
ASVspoof2015.
Table 5: Performance comparison (in terms of %EER) of the
proposed ASV method with baseline ASV by combining CM on
evaluation set of ASVspoof 2015 database. ASV and CM sys-
tems are combined using score fusion with fusion weight α as
discussed in Section 2.2.
ASV System α Male Female Avg.Z S Z S EER
Baseline
1.0 9.18 32.44 8.65 24.76 18.75
0.0 52.75 24.62 51.14 27.30 38.95
0.5 19.83 20.53 22.50 21.23 21.02
0.9 9.47 27.83 9.00 20.29 16.64
Prop. System 2
1.0 8.41 20.20 8.51 15.30 13.10
0.0 52.75 24.62 51.14 27.30 38.95
0.5 19.56 19.99 20.91 20.82 20.32
0.9 8.61 17.91 8.50 14.37 12.34
also improved for human impostor trials in most cases for fused
mode. Further investigations are required to study the general-
ization capability of the proposed ASV system in presence of
more challenging spoofing attack such as replay.
5. Conclusion
Improving ASV performance in the presence of spoofing at-
tacks is an open research problem, especially when matched
(in-domain) data to train countermeasures is unavailable. To
address this problem, we proposed a GMM-UBM based ASV
system consisting of two UBMs, one trained using human
speech and another using spoofed data. Our experiments on
the ASVspoof 2015, using another out-of-domain data (IDIAP-
AVspoof) for training, indicate that the proposed method is
able to considerably reduce the EER for spoofing impostors
compared to the baseline with or without a spoofing detector,
without compromising the performance under zero-effort spoof-
ing. The proposed method, presenting a simple alternative to
dedicated countermeasures trained on custom features, holds
promise.
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